News
In this week’s summary:
- Russian troops are attempting to encircle the town of Kurakhove in Ukraine's Donetsk Region from the north and south while conducting direct assaults on the city from the east.
- According to Ukrainian military analyst Kostiantyn Mashovets, Russian forces are “bogged down in battles” as they attempt offensives from the Pokrovsk to Bakhmut sectors.
- A new wave of Russian offensive action has begun in the Kursk Region — so far without confirmed gains.
- Ukrainian open source mapper DeepState reports that October saw the greatest amount of Ukrainian territory captured by Russian forces in 2024.
- Russian propagandist Anastasia Kashevarova complains about the short “life span” of volunteers in Russia's Armed Forces: “from two weeks to a month.”
- A Ukrainian drone covered more than 1,000 km (620 miles) to strike the Russian Navy’s Caspian Flotilla base in Dagestan.
- Russian forces are increasingly being reinforced with drug addicts and patients suffering from HIV, hepatitis and tuberculosis.
- The Biden administration plans to send Ukraine the remainder of its congressionally approved military aid before Donald Trump's inauguration.
Situation at the front
The main events on the front line this week centered around Kurakhove in the Donetsk Region of Ukraine, where Russian forces attempted to encircle the town from the north and south while launching direct assaults from the east. Russian troops made substantial progress along the northern bank of the reservoir north of Kurakhove, advancing toward Ilinka and establishing positions in Sontsovka to the northwest, threatening Ukraine’s secondary supply lines to the town. From the south, they entered Antonivka, using Su-25 rockets in direct strikes, which highlights the vulnerability of Ukrainian air defenses in the area. With the capture of Maksymivka, Russian forces are now just 12 kilometers (7.5 miles) from the N15 highway — Kurakhove's primary supply route. That being said, direct “meat grinder assaults” on the city from the east have not been successful.
To the north, Russian forces expanded their control west of Selydove. Despite significant losses (1, 2), they managed to secure footholds in the villages of Hryhorivka and Novoaleksiivka. In contrast, the Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU) are counterattacking near Druzhba and Nelepivka on the Toretsk front. A Russian military source on Telegram — Temniy — has claimed gains in the Bakhmut sector, pointing to the AFU’s defensive vulnerabilities near Kurdyumivka. Russia has also advanced around Stupochky and the road from Ivanivske.
Despite the reported gains, Ukrainian military observer Kostiantyn Mashovets has downplayed (1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6) Russia’s progress on the so-called “Kostiantynivka bridgehead” — from Pokrovsk to the Bakhmut front — pointing to operational stagnation. According to his assessment, the Russian command has struggled to make meaningful progress across all sectors of the specified operational area, becoming “bogged down in battles” for control of Chasiv Yar in the Bakhmut direction, and also in the Toretsk agglomeration.
In the Siversk bulge, Russia’s “meat grinder” assaults continue with heavy losses, for which the Russian pro-war community blames the local brigade's command — along with the General Staff. Other pro-war channels are attempting to expose the “anti-crisis” narrative, highlighting footage of strikes on positions that were reportedly captured by Russian forces as early as Sept. 1.
In the Kursk Region, another Russian offensive is underway, which, for now, appears to be unfolding similarly to previous efforts — without notable gains (1, 2). Meanwhile, the region’s residents, who were forced to leave their homes following Ukraine’s incursion, are protesting and voicing complaints to Russia’s federal authorities (1, 2, 3, 4), while MPs in Moscow have proposed arranging festive New Year photo sessions for them.
According to the Ukrainian open source intelligence (OSINT) project DeepState, Russian forces captured 490 square kilometers of territory in October — their best result in 2024. However, these gains come at the cost of the most significant equipment losses since 2022 and the ongoing disbandment of irregular formations, particularly drones and communications units, with their personnel being reassigned to infantry roles.
Mutual strikes and sabotage
The Ukrainian Air Force Command reported (1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7) engaging with 587 drones — including the Iranian-designed Shahed and other unidentified types — over the past week. Of these, 377 were shot down, while 176 were “radar lost” — some due to electronic warfare. Ukraine was also targeted with 10 missiles, of which nine were intercepted.
The most severe consequences of the week's strikes were observed in Zaporizhzhia, where one strike killed six people and injured 23 others, also damaging critical infrastructure. Another attack claimed the lives of 10 people and left 41 injured. In Kharkiv, a missile strike from a Russian S-400 missile system killed a police colonel and injured 46 people, while another strike partially destroyed a residential building, injuring 25 people.
Russia’s Ministry of Defense (MoD) reported (1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7) intercepting 85 Ukrainian fixed-wing drones over Russian territory. One of these drones, based on the A-22 light aircraft, covered over 1,000 km (620 miles) to strike a Russian Navy Caspian Flotilla shipyard in Kaspiysk, Dagestan. Subsequent satellite images did not reveal significant damage to the facility, though nearly all vessels — including Kalibr missile carriers — had to be dispersed across the adjacent waters.
Additionally, Ukraine’s military intelligence agency, HUR, claimed a strike on the Saratov Oil Refinery, located 600 kilometers (373 miles) from the Russia-Ukraine border. The local governor — as is customary — reported that there had been cases of falling debris from intercepted drones. No hard data on the incident has emerged so far.
Losses
Russian Major General Pavel Klimenko, commander of the 5th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade, was killed in the combat zone. It was later revealed that he and a group of military personnel on motorcycles had come under an FPV (first-person view) drone attack. The wounded general was taken to a hospital in Russian-occupied Donetsk, where he died. Earlier, Klimenko's subordinates tortured to death American volunteer Russell Bentley, whose call sign was “Texas.”
Propagandist Anastasia Kashevarova drew attention to a post by the Autonomous Nonprofit Organization Women's Front, which helps participants of Russia’s so-called “special military operation” and their families. The post noted the short “life span” of a Russian stormtrooper on the front lines, citing it as often being “from two weeks to a month.” As she points out, whereas one recruit costs Russia 6-12 million rubles ($61,000 to $122,500), their combat efficiency “is approaching zero.”
Russian commanders are threatening to deploy 17 servicemen suffering from viral hepatitis C to the front lines — despite the threat to others and an explicit ban on carriers of the disease taking part in combat operations. Soldiers of the 1428th Motorized Rifle and 95th Rifle regiments were refused medical board examination, after which they recorded a video address and complained to the Russian Prosecutor-General’s Office. The author of the Telegram channel “Vault 8” says that HIV, hepatitis, and tuberculosis patients, as well as drug addicts, are increasingly being sent to them as reinforcements. He describes the situation as “a blatant violation of every conceivable standard of medical service.”
Russian pro-war channel Fighterbomber reported the loss of a Ka-52 helicopter, with the pilot in command killed and the flight navigator surviving the incident. A photo of the helicopter with a brief condolence message was also published by the Telegram channel Aviahub. Russian Army Aviation pilot Alexei Voevoda's channel (Voevoda Veshchaet) confirmed the loss, adding that the surviving crew member had ejected from the aircraft. According to Voevoda, this is the seventh helicopter crew member who has rescued himself in this way.
Weapons and military vehicles
Last week, the U.S. announced another military aid package under the PDA (Presidential Drawdown Authority), which, in addition to the usual — ammunition for artillery, air defense, and HIMARS — included Stryker armored personnel carriers (APCs), bringing the total number of delivered APCs of this type to 400 units. Also this week, another Ukrainian unit — one of the battalions within the 100th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade — was revealed to have been armed with Bradley infantry fighting vehicles. Notably, the U.S. Department of State previously provided funding for 800 mobile air defense teams. Meanwhile, the Biden administration is faced with the objective of spending the remaining $6 billion in approved military aid to Ukraine before Donald Trump takes office on Jan. 20.
The German government — despite the recent collapse of its ruling coalition and the absence of an approved budget — will still be able to allocate the pledged €4 billion in military aid for Ukraine in 2025.
This week also saw the announcements of new military aid packages from Ukraine’s Western partners:
- Canada will deliver the first of the pledged NASAMS air defense systems to Ukraine by the end of 2024.
- Australia will supply the AFU with 14 military boats.
- The French company Thales will begin producing FZ123 anti-drone rockets in Ukraine.
- Estonia's Frankenburg Technologies has delivered another anti-drone missile for testing by Ukrainian forces.
Russia's defense industry has delivered another batch of TOS-1A “Solntsepek” multiple rocket launchers — these equipped with protective “grills” and explosive reactive armor. Despite sanctions, Russian defense companies are continuing to acquire Western equipment and even provide services to NATO-member security forces — and gaining information on the locations of the bloc’s military bases across Europe.
Meanwhile, following a series of investigations by The Insider, the government of Taiwan has announced it will completely halt the export of industrial machine tools to Russia. However, Russian troops have received North Korean-made Type 73 machine guns, which have proven effective in various conflicts, and they continue to be supplied with munitions from the DPRK — a crucial bit of help given the near depletion of Moscow’s Soviet-era stockpiles, even if the quality of North Korean munitions remains subpar.
Russia’s frontline innovators are continuing to display modifications to military and civilian vehicles, with the following spotted this week: a buggy based on the VAZ-2101 (“Zhiguli”) 4-door sedan nicknamed the “Faramobile,” a T-90 tank with bricks in its reactive armor blocks, and a T-72B tank with additional protection made from rubber conveyor belt segments that resemble roll-up blinds.
Previous weekly summary (Oct. 26 to Nov. 1, 2024):
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