Nonstop “meat grinder assault”: Evaluating Russia's 365 day offensive around Avdiivka

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From Avdiivka to Vuhledar

The Insider has already detailed the beginning and end of the battle for Avdiivka and provided estimates of the Russian army's losses, both of personnel and of equipment, during the operation. After the town was captured this past February, the Russian offensive in the Pokrovsk district of the Donetsk region continued using the same methods: large-scale mechanized assaults alternated with attacks by small infantry groups. As a result, Russia’s 30-kilometer advance from the western outskirts of Avdiivka to the eastern approaches of Myrnohrad took more than six months. Nevertheless, this direction has proven to be the most successful for the Russian Armed Forces in terms of territorial gains.

For comparison, the maximum advance during the Russian attack in northern Kharkiv in May 2024 was 10 kilometers — before the front stagnated. Elsewhere, including the areas around Chasiv Yar, the Toretsk agglomeration, Robotyne, and Vuhledar, progress has been measured in mere kilometers or even hundreds of meters. Among the notable towns captured were Krasnohorivka (population 16,398 as of the 2001 census), Novohrodivka (17,473), and Vuhledar (17,518).

According to data from the pro-Russian OSINT resource LostArmour, since October 2023 the Russian army has come to occupy over 2,047.9 additional square kilometers of Ukrainian territory. At the same time, as of late autumn 2023, the area of the Donetsk region still under Ukrainian control was more than 11,000 square kilometers (43% of the region’s total area). Given the current pace of the Russian offensive, even the short-term goals of the “Special Military Operation” — namely, the capture of the “annexed” Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhzhia and Kherson regions of Ukraine — are unlikely to be achieved anytime soon.

Experts interviewed by The Insider agree with this assessment. In particular, Israeli military analyst David Handelman believes:

“The physical occupation of all four regions at this pace is a very long process, and even capturing the Donetsk region alone is a big task that will take time to 'chew through.' For now, the Russian leadership is focusing on slow advances and wearing down the enemy, which could eventually push Ukraine toward political concessions.”

Military expert Yan Matveyev shares a similar view:

“Even at this year's pace, it will take the Russian army many years to occupy all these territories. Just capturing the Donetsk region alone would take 2-3 years of fighting like this, at a minimum, unless the Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU) either deliberately retreat or lose the ability to resist.”

Ukrainian military analyst Oleksandr Kovalenko points out that the most combat-ready part of the Russian forces in Ukraine was concentrated in the operational zone near Avdiivka, yet even they only managed to advance 29 kilometers in a year:

“Given how bloody the fighting was for these 29 kilometers, how will they manage to secure the entire Donetsk region? Especially when taking into account the challenge of Kostiantynivka and the fact that they've been battering Chasiv Yar for a year now. It's not even Bakhmut or Avdiivka, it's Chasiv Yar. And yet, they've been unable to break through for a year. And that's without even mentioning the Sloviansk-Kramatorsk agglomeration, a colossal urban area that's been fortified since 2014.”

However, judging strictly by the statistics, the Russian offensive picked up speed again in August-September 2024, occupying 815 additional square kilometers — two-thirds of the total territory captured over the past ten months. Ukrainian military channels and AFU fighters speaking to the media point to several reasons for this acceleration: the infiltration tactics of small Russian infantry groups, Russia’s active use of drones (including to disrupt supplies and evacuations of the wounded), and a significant Russian manpower advantage.

Russian forces have managed to maintain their manpower advantage on key fronts, despite the absence of a new wave of mobilization. This is partly due to the shortage of Ukrainian reserves, some of whom are deployed in the Kursk region. Delayed deliveries of equipment from Western allies, has also played a role, with Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zelensky saying that barely four of the country’s 14 newly trained brigades have been fully equipped so far.

While the battle for Avdiivka took five months, Vuhledar was captured in just a few weeks, and the assault on Novohrodivka in the Pokrovsk direction was completed in a matter of days. On the other hand, the quick storming of Vuhledar itself, according to one Z-channel, was only made possible by months of bloody fighting in neighboring settlements.

Nevertheless, the Russian offensive has not been as smooth as one might infer from Ministry of Defense reports. Instead, it has been accompanied by significant losses in equipment and personnel, and attempts by the Russian command to turn numerous tactical successes into operational breakthroughs have largely failed.

Coping with losses to the last

According to data from Oryx, over the past year, 849 Russian tanks, 1,554 IFVs, 112 APCs, and 554 other armored combat vehicles, along with 69 artillery units, 272 self-propelled guns (SPGs), and 120 multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS), have been destroyed or captured. More than a third of these losses occurred in the Pokrovsk direction of the Donbas, where Russian forces have lost 381 tanks, 835 armored vehicles, and 73 artillery systems over the past year.

Russia’s stock of combat-ready armored vehicles is rapidly being depleted. As of May 2024, OSINT researchers put the number of Russian armored vehicles of various types at 8,530, of which only 5,550 were operational. More recently, they have estimated that Russia has fewer than 4,000 tanks remaining in storage (with up to 80% likely beyond repair). Towed artillery and SPG supplies are also dwindling. Given these equipment resources, the current — or even a faster — pace of the offensive will not be sufficient to achieve even the most immediate goals of the “Special Military Operation,” such as reaching the borders of the “annexed” regions. Furthermore, estimates indicate that Russia’s annual production of new tanks and IFVs is limited to only a few hundred units.

The reasons for these equipment losses include Ukraine’s use of FPV drones, mines, and anti-tank guided missiles (ATGMs). During mechanized assaults, Russia uses insufficient engineering equipment for mine clearance, and Ukrainian countermeasures are inadequately suppressed (i.e. the principles of combined arms combat are not adhered to on the Russian side). Often, vehicles become disposable “taxis” for delivering infantry to enemy positions, where both the soldiers and their transport are then destroyed en masse — as happened during the recent assault on Vovchansk (1, 2).

More and more units on the front line are effectively becoming leg infantry, lacking armored vehicles, while the available equipment is being adapted for frontline needs. For example, roofs are being removed from MT-LB transport vehicles, tanks are being converted into heavy APCs — or even into increasingly advanced “turtle tanks”, sometimes equipped with cameras and ramps for troops and crew.

Increasingly, motorcycles, ATVs, and even buggies based on the Soviet-era Moskvitch car are in demand for logistics and infantry transport on the battlefield. According to Ukrainian military analyst Kostiantyn Mashovets, there are no tank regiments in the newly formed Russian motorized rifle divisions, in contrast to similar formations established just a year ago. The expert argues that offensive tactics relying solely on infantry and artillery lead to heavy infantry losses, which are likely to be replenished through any means other than mobilization.

Personnel

Some Russian pro-war commentators, discussing the capture of new settlements, note that despite breakthroughs in the Ukrainian defenses at certain points, Russian troops lack reserves to capitalize on successes and gain operational freedom. This can explain the accelerated but still comparatively slow pace of the Russian advance. As a result, Ukrainian forces consistently establish new defensive lines, and Russian attempts to breach them only lead to even greater losses.

By the end of 2023, Mediazona and Meduza estimated the total number of Russian military deaths at 75,000, based on an analysis of inheritance records. In the period from March 15 to July 5 of this year, their estimate added approximately 39,000 more. While it is not advisable to extrapolate this number for an entire year, considering that in previous wars the ratio of killed to wounded was at least 1:3, it can be confidently stated that the total losses over the year of the Russian offensive are in the hundreds of thousands. This figure is at least on par with the estimated recruitment rates for contract soldiers, which amounted to 166,000 for the first half of 2024.

Complaints about personnel shortages and the exhaustion of advancing forces are increasingly common among the pro-war community (1, 2). As the Russian leadership hesitates to initiate a new wave of mobilization, replenishments are being sought through various means: sick and wounded soldiers are being sent back to the front, those who refused to fight are being coerced back into service through torture and a “Gulag-style” punishment system, valuable specialists like drone operators are being transferred to assault units, and infantry units are being formed from personnel of other branches, including the Aerospace Forces (VKS) and the Navy (VMF) (1, 2). Russia is also engaging in the active recruitment of foreign mercenaries, particularly from the Middle East and India, although many of the latter were sent home following intervention by Prime Minister Narendra Modi.

Recruitment for the war also includes raids targeting migrants from Central Asia who have recently acquired Russian citizenship. Alexander Bastrykin, head of Russia’s Investigative Committee, reported that 10,000 new citizens have already been sent to “dig trenches” in the combat zone. Additionally, legal changes are creating more avenues for individuals with criminal backgrounds to join the military — reports indicate that even female former prisoners can be counted among the soldiers — and among the casualties. However, the majority of recent reinforcements have come via recruitment for contract service, with regional incentives for enlistment reaching new highs. The ongoing complaints about personnel shortages, despite this influx, stem from issues with training new recruits and the tactics used to deploy them.

Disposable men

A 2023 RUSI report on the evolution of Russian military tactics noted that some soldiers serve as “disposable” infantry, whose task involves taking heavy losses while weakening Ukrainian positions to the point that a decisive assault using better trained and equipped troops can capture them. While this “disposable” role was initially filled by mobilized soldiers and convicts, it now seems to be assigned to the “contract” reinforcements. The skills of these soldiers are limited, as the Russian military has failed to establish a robust training system for new recruits.

New contract soldiers receive only a few days of training, while in the Ukrainian army, this process takes anywhere from 30 days to three months — and even then, Ukrainian commanders still complain about the inadequate readiness of their reinforcements. On the Russian side, this issue is compounded by “incompetent“ mid-level commanders who lack crucial skills (such as coordinating drone operations) and who thus send troops into relentless “meat grinder assaults” without sufficient fire support.

Ukrainian unit accounts are filled with footage that shows them repelling large-scale Russian mechanized assaults, while relatives of Russian servicemen share stories of massive losses. The problem has not been not resolved by the formation of specially organized “Storm” units, which were initially conceived as elite infantry for breaching enemy defenses, similar to the German stormtroopers of World War I.

This is how Major General Ivan Popov (currently under investigation for fraud) attempted to structure his assault units. However, today the “Storms” have essentially turned into penal battalions, where servicemen who have fallen out of favor with the command are assigned.

Artless tactics

Russian tactical miscalculations are offset by its superior artillery fire and airstrikes. In the winter of 2023–2024, while U.S. military aid for Ukraine was held up in Congress, the ratio of artillery shells used on the battlefield was as high as 10 to 1 in Russia's favor. Although this discrepancy has since decreased, it still remains at least 3 to 1.

The situation could improve thanks to Ukrainian strikes on Russian ammunition depots. However, Russian glide bombs with UMPK modules and UMPB D-30 SN munitions, launched at an intensity of up to 900 per week, continue to pose a problem. These bombs are used both in high-explosive and cluster configurations, and the U.S. administration is not in a hurry to permit Ukraine to strike Russian airfields with long-range missiles, a step that could partially resolve this issue.

Russian tactical innovations on the battlefield are primarily based on superiority in manpower. Taking advantage of the absence of a continuous front, Russian forces attempt to bypass Ukrainian positions, accumulating forces for a subsequent encirclement of isolated Ukrainian units.

Sometimes this tactic yields results: for example, in July, two Ukrainian battalions of the 31st Separate Mechanized Brigade were encircled on the Pokrovsk direction but managed to break out. Near Vuhledar, the Russians brought infantry units behind the first and even second lines of Ukraine's defense, causing “morally and psychologically weak units” to retreat even from advantageous positions. In the area around Chasiv Yar, Russian forces are employing the tactic of “infiltrating” small groups through the front line to target Ukrainian mortar positions and drone operators.

A series of tactical successes in itself holds operational significance: advancing towards Pokrovsk threatens the Ukrainian military’s railway supply lines in Donbas, and reaching the Oskil River would split the Ukrainian grouping on the left bank in two, complicating the defense of Kupiansk. Likewise, the Russian assaults on Chasiv Yar and the Toretsk agglomeration could open paths to Sloviansk, Kramatorsk, and Kostiantynivka — the last major cities in Donetsk region under Ukrainian control.

However, the Russian Armed Forces have not managed to break through the Ukrainian defenses on a large scale. One reason for this may be the lack of a second echelon of forces, which, according to Soviet military doctrine, should be responsible for exploiting success and transforming it from a tactical to an operational breakthrough.

Yan Matveev believes that Russia's offensive over the past year is better understood as a series of separate operations that began and ended during that period, inevitably running out of steam:

“For example, Vuhledar. Now we observe that Russian forces have essentially stopped there, having reached their goal. We also see the fading of the offensive in the Pokrovsk direction. But this is due to the intense fighting along the Ukrainian defense line. Ukrainian forces have entrenched themselves and are preventing the Russian army from advancing.”

David Hendelman believes that Russian forces still have the capacity to continue their slow-paced offensive for an extended period, much as they have so far.

Ukrainian expert Oleksandr Kovalenko attributes the halt of the Russian offensive to external forces:

“This depends on various factors, including continued international support for Ukraine — on which we remain critically dependent — and the AFU's ability to adapt to Russian tactics.”

The Russian command, having chosen a strategy of sustained pressure along the entire front, shows a lack of what military literature refers to as “operational art” — the ability to plan and execute operations effectively. This skill allows for more significant successes with fewer losses by skillfully applying forces and resources, as well as demonstrating command expertise. By contrast, Ukrainian command displayed operational art during the planning and execution of the 2022 Kharkiv counteroffensive and the recent operation in the Kursk region.

Unable to achieve a quick victory, the Russian command has opted for a war of attrition. However, considering the scale of Russian losses in both personnel and equipment, this strategy could backfire — especially if Western countries agree to increase military aid to Ukraine while removing restrictions on its use. On the other hand, if support for Ukraine diminishes following the U.S. election, Russia’s plan to “wear down” the Ukrainian army could ultimately succeed.