Drones vs. Depots: Ukraine’s new strategy targets ammo caches — and Russia has no response

RU

Since late August, Ukrainian forces have employed long-range drones and missiles to target ammunition depots both within Russia and in occupied Ukrainian territories, striking at least five major storage facilities:

• On Aug. 24 and Sept. 7, ammunition depots in the Voronezh Region’s Ostrogozhsky District were attacked.
• On Sept. 13, an ammunition depot near occupied Mariupol was hit.
• On Sept. 18, Ukraine struck the 107th GRAU (Main Missile and Artillery Directorate) arsenal near Toropets in the Tver Region.
• On Sept. 21, strikes were launched against a depot near Tikhoretsk in the Krasnodar Region and the 23rd GRAU arsenal in the Tver Region.
• On Sept. 29, an arsenal near the village of Kotluban in Russia’s southern Volgograd Region was targeted, though the depot itself was not hit.
• On Oct. 9, the 67th GRAU arsenal was hit near Karachev in Russia's Bryansk Region and a Shahed drone storage facility was struck near Yeisk in the Krasnodar Region.

These attacks have been effective: according to satellite imagery analysis conducted by a Ukrainian open source intelligence (OSINT) project, 66% to 93% of ammunition storage facilities in Russia’s Tver and Krasnodar regions have been destroyed. A record number of drones were used in these strikes (the Russian Ministry of Defense reported over 100 UAVs shot down on Sept. 21 alone).

The situation may have been exacerbated by safety lapses on the Russian side, as satellite imagery indicates that ammunition was frequently stored out in the open. According to Tatarigami_UA, a military blogger and Ukrainian reserve officer, the depots in the Krasnodar and Voronezh regions play a critical role in supplying Russian frontline forces in Ukraine. Moreover, the Tikhoretsk depot was a key hub for artillery ammunition shipments from North Korea.

This current situation calls to mind the summer of 2022, when Russian depots in Ukraine’s occupied territories were repeatedly destroyed by high-precision HIMARS rockets. This time, however, the strikes are being carried out using Ukrainian-made munitions, not Western weaponry — an important distinction as Ukraine continues to seek approval from its allies to use long-range Western missiles on internationally recognized Russian territory.

The latest Ukrainian strikes have shown that, despite Russia adjusting its logistics to counter HIMARS, it still heavily depends on large centralized ammunition depots and distribution networks, much like it did in the wars of the 20th century. While Russia relocated its depots farther from the front lines after the HIMARS attacks, they remain vulnerable to long-range precision strikes — even deep in the rear.

Old-school logistics

As the saying goes, “amateurs talk tactics, professionals talk logistics.” This has never been truer than in the age of industrial wars, where the growing numbers and rate of fire of artillery and small arms increased armies' demand for ammunition. For both the Russian Imperial Army during World War I and the Soviet Red Army in World War II, logistics were complicated by the vast distances between munitions factories and the front lines — as well as by the notoriously poor condition of Russia’s road network.

The Russian army's supply system was built along the lines that remain largely unchanged to this day: in peacetime, munitions were stored in large depots with rail access, and in wartime, they were transported either from these depots or directly from factories by rail to an unloading station closest to the front (referred to as the “railhead” or “final unloading point” in military terms).

In the old days, ammunition was unloaded and moved to the front by horse-drawn carts; later, trucks took on this role. This cumbersome but effective system was overseen by Russia’s Main Artillery Directorate, established in 1862. In 1960, the name was changed to the Main Rocket and Artillery Directorate (GRAU), which manages Russia’s artillery and munitions to this day.

Even during the wars of the 20th century, centralized depots were prime targets for enemy fire. In World War II, Soviet depots were attacked by German aircraft, such as the Junkers Ju 87 dive bombers. The Red Army defended the sites using ground-based air defenses and fighter aircraft. Nazi Germany lacked the strategic air power to strike depots and factories deep in Soviet rear areas, and the logistics system from that time has remained largely intact. It was used during the war in Donbas from 2014 to 2022 — and is still being used during the current full-scale invasion of Ukraine.

Enter HIMARS

The vulnerability of frontline depots first became apparent to the Russian army in Syria — in 2017 — when an ISIS drone destroyed a large government forces' ammunition depot at a stadium in Deir ez-Zor with a single munition drop. However, as recently noted by Kremlin-aligned “military correspondent” Alexander Kharchenko, the Russian Armed Forces, which had been integrating their “Syrian experience” into training regimens prior to the invasion of Ukraine, considered it beneath them to learn anything from their Syrian allies or from the various anti-Assad forces. As a result, no conclusions were drawn about logistical vulnerabilities, and the war continued to be waged following Soviet-era manuals.

Problems began to emerge in the spring of 2022, after Moscow unleashed its full-scale invasion of Ukraine, as frontline depots and trucks carrying ammunition became targets for Ukrainian drones and artillery strikes guided by UAVs.

Large depots at railway unloading points remained relatively secure until the U.S. provided Ukraine with HIMARS and M270 multiple-launch rocket systems (MLRS). These systems' key advantage — aside from their mobility and quick reloading time — was the precision of their GPS-guided GMLRS munitions, capable of hitting targets up to 70 km away. Soon, Russian ammunition depots, command posts, and equipment storage areas across the front were ablaze. The damage from artillery strikes in early July 2022 alone was estimated at $600 million.

This disruption of Russian logistics helped halt Moscow’s advance on the Donbas in 2022. The first “shell famine” for Russian forces aided Ukraine's successful offensives in the Kharkiv and Kherson regions. Over time, however, the Russian military adapted to this threat, relocating depots beyond GMLRS range, often into internationally recognized Russian territory, where no Western weapons whatsoever could be used until mid-2024.

Although the distance that shells needed to travel by truck before arriving at the front increased, it remained manageable: Russian artillery continued to raze Ukrainian cities, including Bakhmut, Avdiivka, and Toretsk. The accuracy of Western rockets was, meanwhile, being degraded by electronic warfare. For a time, Russia’s rear logistics were once again relatively safe. That time has passed, at least until another adaptation is found.

The rear no longer exists

Recently, Ukraine’s diplomatic efforts have been aimed at permanently lifting restrictions on the use of Western weapons against military targets on internationally recognized Russian territory. The ban on using long-range ATACMS and Storm Shadow/SCALP-EG missiles remains in place — Washington has so far found Ukraine’s arguments unconvincing. As a result, Ukraine’s defense industry has been developing its own long-range strike systems, which are free from external limitations.

In 2023, it was revealed that Ukraine’s Neptune anti-ship cruise missiles, which in April 2022 sank the Moskva cruiser — the flagship of Russia’s Black Sea Fleet — had been adapted for strikes on land targets. That same year, Ukraine developed the long-range “Liutyi” UAV as a counterpart to Iranian-designed Shahed drones used by Russia. Finally, in August 2024, President Zelensky announced the first successful use of the Palianytsia drone missile system. All of these munitions are now being deployed in Ukraine’s strike campaign against Russia’s rear areas.

Notable targets in Russia and Russian-occupied Ukrainian territories have included oil refineries and depots, with one in the southern Rostov Region burning for 16 days. Strikes on airfields have also destroyed aircraft, ammunition, and UMPK guidance kits (which Russia uses to turn unguided Soviet bombs into precision-guided standoff munitions). Yet despite regular Ukrainian attacks, Russia’s energy sector and oil infrastructure have not suffered systemic disruptions, and the Russian Aerospace Forces have learned to move their aircraft out of harm’s way when slow-moving drones approach. Nonetheless, Russia’s military has found that some obvious targets cannot be relocated so easily — ammunition depots.

The damage from Ukraine’s initial attacks has been substantial. Russia’s 107th arsenal, reportedly 76% destroyed, may have stored up to 30,000 tons of ammunition.

This could represent around 450,000 Grad MLRS rockets, or 15,000-16,000 S-400 surface-to-air missiles (which may have been stored at the facility, as per sources in Ukraine’s security agencies). Ukraine’s Center for Countering Disinformation, along with Estonian intelligence, estimated the volume of destroyed Russian munitions as being enough to sustain several months of warfare. The Shahed storage facility, according to different data, contained from over 100 to 400 of those UAVs, which would have been enough for days or even weeks of sustained air raids on Ukrainian infrastructure.

Equally important is the fact that some of the destroyed depots were directly involved in military logistics. Part of the ammunition at the Tikhoretsk depot was stored out in the open, likely awaiting shipment to the front. This depot was also part of the North Korean ammunition supply chain. Before the attack, surface-to-air missiles were being delivered to the 23rd arsenal from Belarus. A train was also destroyed near one of the depots in the area around Toropets, indicating the active use of the storage facility.

The depot that was hit in the Voronezh Region, as per analysis from Frontelligence Insight, was used to supply the front with munitions for the Grad MLRS and S-300 SAMs (which are also used to strike ground targets). In short, after more than a year of relative calm, Russian frontline logistics are once again under sustained attack.

A drone will always get through

Following another strike, prominent Russian military blogger Fighterbomber stated flat out: “We cannot defend our ammunition depots today.” In his view, Ukraine faces similar challenges, though the last major Ukrainian depot to be hit was in May 2023 near Khmelnytskyi. The solutions Ukraine has found to protect itself from Russian drones are frequently mentioned by Russian pro-war channels.

First, mobile air defense groups are being utilized — during one strike on Ukraine’s northern regions this winter, these groups accounted for 47% of downed Russian drones and 11% of downed Russian cruise missiles. Ukraine's “Virazh-Planshet” situational awareness system, which allows air defense operators to monitor a real-time, updated map of the air situation compiled from various sources, is also frequently mentioned.

However, it is important to note that Ukraine has been using mobile air defense groups for almost two years — since the first Shahed strikes — while the Virazh-Planshet system was developed long before Russia’s full-scale invasion. It is unlikely that Russia can quickly replicate Ukraine’s progress in air defense, especially since there have been no significant advances in defending Russian territory from large-scale attacks even after suffering months of strikes.

Russia could theoretically move depots further inland, but they are already at the limit of their range: the distance from Tikhoretsk and Ostrogozhsk to the front lines is hundreds of kilometers by road. The further away the depots are from the front, the more trucks will be needed to transport the ammunition, and this is unlikely to be feasible for the Russian army due to a lack of equipment and personnel. Moreover, the Liutyi drone has a reported range of 1,000 km (over 620 miles), meaning most of European Russia is still within its reach.

Another solution would be to abandon large depots and switch to a distributed supply system that is more resistant to air attacks — similar to the way the North Vietnamese Army and their southern Viet Cong proxies operated in the 1960s-1970s. This allowed them to continue the war despite American bombing campaigns. However, such a solution would require Russia to abandon its centralized supply system and rebuild supply chains on entirely new principles. This represents an immense task for Russia’s slow-moving logistics — one comparable to creating an effective counter-drone defense system, which the Russian military has also so far failed to do.