The hijacking of Europa. Cutting ties with EU, Georgia's ruling party sees its ratings plummet but remains ahead of opposition

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An opposition-minded president

Paradoxically, Georgia’s main opposition figure in 2024 turned out to be the country's president, Salome Zourabichvili. A French-born politician who only received Georgian citizenship in 2004, Zourabichvili entered Tbilisi’s political stage as a foreigner. For a long time she was considered a protege of the elites, but she has gained considerable popular support in recent years. In a July poll by Edison Research, commissioned by the opposition TV channel Formula, 63% of respondents were favorably inclined toward Zourabichvili, making her the most popular politician in the country — on par with former president Giorgi Margvelashvili. Billionaire and honorary chairman of the ruling Georgian Dream party Bidzina Ivanishvili is well-liked by only 36% of respondents.

Zourabichvili, whose presidency expires in October, is leveraging her popularity in order to act as a political arbiter — and to prevent Georgian Dream from staying in power. And of course, if the ruling party wins, Zourabichvili will almost certainly be unable to secure re-election, as direct presidential elections in Georgia have been replaced by the selection of the president in parliament.

In a September interview with Le Figaro, Zourabichvili stated that Georgian Dream seeks to cut the country off from Europe and once again make it a Russian protectorate. Therefore, in late October, voters will be faced with an existential choice that will determine the fate of the country. As Zourabichvili says, most Georgians — herself included — see their country as part of Europe. She has been trying to build a majority coalition since the spring, calling on pro-European opposition forces to support her Georgian Charter.

The charter is not a political pre-election bloc but a written commitment by the signatory parties to refrain from criticizing one another during the election campaign — and to act together once elected to parliament. According to this coalition agreement, the current opposition, having won a majority, would go on to form a government, repeal laws contrary to Georgia's European course, restore confidence in the justice system, reform the security services, and change the electoral system — for example, by lowering the threshold for parties in the next elections from the current 5%. When these efforts are completed, Georgia would hold early elections under the new rules, allowing the coalition’s temporary political allies to compete amongst themselves for power.

At present, Zourabichvili's charter has more than 15 signatories, and some of the opposition parties have united into blocs to increase their chances of getting into parliament.

Who can challenge Georgian Dream?

Among the opposition forces, the center-right Unity to Save Georgia may well end up getting the most seats in the parliament: according to Edison Research, they can count on 20% of the vote.

The bloc includes Mikheil Saakashvili's United National Movement (36 seats in the current parliament), chaired by Tinatin Bokuchava, who took over after the party's previous leader, Levan Khabeishvili, was beaten by security agents at protests against the ‘foreign agents’ law, compelling him to step down for health reasons. Also in the bloc are Strategy Aghmashenebeli (four seats in the parliament), a party created by UNM member Giorgi Vashadze, and European Georgia, which was founded by Gigi Tsereteli, former president of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly and also a member of the UNM until 2017.

Their election campaign revolves around a return to European integration and also offers simple, populist promises like raising salaries and pensions, helping families by introducing new allowances, and fighting monopolies to lower prices.

Almost 11% of the respondents are ready to vote for another opposition bloc: Coalition for Change — Nika Gvaramia, Nika Melia, Girchi, Droa! It includes the parties Ahali, Girchi — More Freedom, and Droa! The leading force in the coalition is Ahali.

The coalition is a brainchild of two UNM members: Nika Melia (former UNM chairperson) and Nika Gvaramia (founder of the Mtavari Arhi opposition TV channel). Both have been political prisoners during Ivanishvili's rule. As for Girchi — More Freedom, it is a libertarian party that gained prominence fighting for the legalization of cannabis use (the party now has four seats in parliament). The Droa! party was created in 2021 by Elene Khoshtaria, former First Deputy Minister for Euro-Atlantic Integration.

In August 2024, two other small parties joined the alliance: the Republican Party of Georgia and Activists for the Future. As their main goal, the coalition of small parties sees the implementation of Zourabichvili's Georgian Charter; they also prioritize developing the economy, strengthening regional autonomy, and promoting education reform.

Another 9.3% of respondents are ready to vote for the centrist big-tent coalition Strong Georgia. It includes For the People (not currently in parliament), the Freedom Square movement (also not currently in parliamenty), Lelo for Georgia (four seats in the current parliament), and Citizens (two incumbent MPs). The popular former Georgian president Giorgi Margvelashvili joined this bloc on Sep. 25.

Margvelashvili was president during Georgian Dream's first term (2013-2018), elected as the ruling party's candidate. Shortly after his election, he clashed with Ivanishvili's forces and made several attempts to veto their bills. After the end of his presidential term, Margvelashvili retired from politics, returned to teaching, took up carpentry, and even rented out a house on Airbnb. Nevertheless, he has retained his popularity: with an approval rating of 63% in the Edison Research poll, he can bring Strong Georgia a lot of additional votes.

Lelo, the bloc's main parliamentary party, was created in 2019 by Georgian businessmen Mamuka Khazaradze and Badri Japaridze. Khazaradze is known as the co-founder of TBC, one of Georgia’s largest banks. Both entered politics after facing money laundering charges, which they presented as a politically motivated case ordered by Georgian Dream.

For the People is a party founded by Ana Dolidze, former head of an active and influential NGO — the Georgian Young Lawyers’ Association. In 2022, Dolidze’s New York Times profile described her as a figure who could shake up the status quo in Georgian politics. In turn, Freedom Square is a political movement created just this past summer by active participants in the protests against the ‘foreign agent’ law. Finally, Citizens is the party of former journalist Aleko Elisashvili.

In its campaign, Strong Georgia focuses on foreign policy, with a view to countering Russia both internationally and domestically. The bloc promises to fully join EU sanctions against Russia and to increase trade with European countries. Other proposals include implementing a visa regime for Russians (who can currently stay in Georgia for 365 days with nothing more than a Russian passport), while also making it more difficult for Russian citizens to buy real estate, gain employment, and obtain Georgian citizenship. The group also advocates a ban on direct air traffic with Russia.

Without joining any coalition, former Prime Minister Giorgi Gakharia's For Georgia party is likely to enter parliament with around 10.5% of votes. Like former president Margvelashvili, Gakharia is a former Ivanishvili associate. He headed the Georgian government in 2019-2021, left Georgian Dream, and resigned over disagreements with fellow party members over the arrest of UNM head Nika Melia in 2021. Several other disillusioned Georgian Dream members also joined Gakharia's party. The ex-prime minister initially refused to join Zourabichvili’s Charter because of his opposition to the early elections clause, but on Sep. 23 he gave in and signed the agreement with the rest of the opposition.

Gakharia's program stands out thanks to its plans for ambitious infrastructure projects: four new bridges and 15 new metro stations in Tbilisi, and an above-ground line between Tbilisi and the nearby town of Rustavi. Like many of its rivals, For Georgia promises to raise the minimum wage, increase pensions, expand social benefits for families with children, and fight corruption and high prices.

Salome Zourabichvili tried to unite For Georgia and Strong Georgia, as together they could have become the second most powerful political force in the country, but the negotiations failed .As a result, according to Edison Research, by refusing to unite the centrists (Strong Georgia and For Georgia) lost around 5% of their support.

According to opinion polls, Iago Khvichia's Girchi and the Georgian Labor Party have a chance of overcoming the 5% threshold for parliamentary representation. Established in 2016, Girchi split into two parties in 2020: Girchi — More Freedom, which is part of the Coalition for Change, and Khvichia's Girchi, which stands on its own.

According to experts from the Institute of Social Studies and Analysis (ISSA), the three coalitions could actually be more successful separately, as 60% of opposition-minded and undecided voters do not support the idea of a unified opposition list.

However, Giorgi Gobronidze of the International Black Sea University (IBSU) believes that the failure to unite harms the opposition:

“Opinion polls suggest the opposition can count on 60% of the votes. But how would it get them? In fragments. [Opposition politicians] will not and cannot form a government. They are so consumed by their ambitions that they cannot unite for the common good — not even temporarily. [They say] ‘I'm not going to stand by his side. I'm not talking to him. I will not cooperate with him.’”

A non-obvious arrangement

According to Edison Research, Georgian Dream will get 32.3% of the vote — the lowest result since its foundation. However, “Dreamers” have dismissed the Edison polls commissioned by the opposition channel Formula. They publish their own forecasts via the pro-government TV channel Imedi, arguing they will win roughly 60% — and a constitutional majority in parliament.

Political analyst Paata Zakareishvili does not rule out the possibility that Georgian Dream will end up being forced into a coalition with some of the opposition if its result falls short of a simple majority. However, it has an alternative option: “If no one colludes with [Georgian Dream], and [if] the four [opposition blocs] form a united front, they have a chance to turn Georgian Dream into a minority and take control.”

As Zakareishvili explains, the unity of the opposition depends on Unity to Save Georgia:

“The opposition has a different problem: Saakashvili's [United] National Movement with its big ambitions. It will get the most votes. ...They might say: ‘We are in charge here; we will dictate terms’ — and then no one will want to join them. In such an event, the parliament could collapse, necessitating early elections. And then Georgian Dream will definitely win.”

If the UNM's conditions are unacceptable to other parties, Zakareishvili believes this may force some of the opposition to enter into a coalition with Georgian Dream — provided, however, that Ivanishvili's party makes concessions and resumes negotiation on Georgia’s integration with the EU.

Ivanishvili is looking for convenient enemies

In its election campaign, Georgian Dream is betting on two major themes. Firstly, the ruling party is trying to capitalize on its purported success in preventing Georgia from being dragged into the war between Russia and Ukraine. In its campaign narrative, Georgian Dream makes use of posters that contrast photographs of destroyed Ukrainian cities with shots of peaceful Georgia. Secondly, they promise to resume negotiations on the return of Abkhazia and South Ossetia to Georgia.

“We will definitely find the strength to apologize for the fact that following the received assignment, the treacherous National Movement shrouded our Ossetian sisters and brothers in flames of fire in 2008,” Georgian Dream honorary chairman Bidzina Ivanishvili said on Sep. 15 during an election rally in Gori, the city that suffered the most during the 2008 war with Russia. This is not the first time Ivanishvili has accused the United National Movement and former president Mikheil Saakashvili of unleashing a war that neither Georgians nor Ossetians needed. Now the de facto leader of Georgian Dream assures the population that his party does not seek a constitutional majority in order to hold onto power, but rather to pass amendments on the country’s territorial integrity. According to Ivanishvili, Tbilisi should assume a “firm but appropriate position towards Russia” if it is to restore Georgia's territorial integrity in the future. However, recent statistics suggest that 85% of Georgians are reluctant to apologize to Ossetians.

Moreover, even in Russia, not everyone believes that “amendments” coupled with an “appropriate position” would do the trick of restoring Georgian control over its internationally recognized borders. Thus, Konstantin Zatulin, first deputy chairman of the Russian State Duma Committee on Commonwealth of Independent State Affairs, said that Ivanishvili could hope to convince only the domestic audience, not Russia: “This ship sailed a long time ago. There will be no return of Abkhazia or South Ossetia to Georgia.” However, at the official level, Moscow is perceived as pushing the Georgian authorities to take steps in this direction.

For instance, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov has hinted publicly at the possibility of an agreement: “It's obvious that the current Georgian leadership is giving an honest assessment of the past. They even said as much: that they ‘want historical reconciliation.’ It is up to the countries themselves — both Abkhazia and South Ossetia — to decide what form this reconciliation can take.”

In general, Georgian Dream’s campaign is built on the humiliation of opponents, who are labeled as traitors and renegades. Ivanishvili’s nemesis is, of course, the imprisoned ex-president Mikheil Saakashvili. It was amidst a confrontation with Saakashvili that Georgian Dream came to power 12 years ago. Ahead of the 2024 elections, if one were to believe the ruling party's statements rather than the objective reality that Saakashvili’s side has been out of power for more than a decade, the opponent has only grown in strength. Ivanishvili's “list of traitors” includes all opponents of the current Georgian government, even non-profit organizations, which he targets using the notorious Georgian version of the Russian “foreign agent” law.

However, mobilization against the “global agents of war” is clearly not enough for Ivanishvili. In the run-up to the elections, Georgians were offered another enemy to get them to rally around the Georgian Dream: the LGBTQ+ community. Just over a month before the election, a law banning “LGBT propaganda” was passed in the third reading. Like the “foreign agent” law, it received support from 84 ruling party deputies and their allies. The day after the law was passed, Georgia was shaken by the murder of transgender woman Kesaria Abramidze. Abramidze was a popular model and actress and did not hide her gender identity. Even though the man accused of killing Abramidze was her former partner, and Abramidze had previously spoken out about his violent treatment of her, the murder appeared to be symbolically clearly linked to the passage of the law. Hundreds of people, including President Salome Zourabichvili, attended Abramidze’s funeral.

The purpose of homophobic legislation in Georgia, according to NGOs and experts, is to divert society's attention away from real problems. There is little doubt that this tactic will earn Georgian Dream more votes in the election. According to the Caucasus Barometer survey conducted in the spring of 2024, homophobic attitudes are widespread in Georgian society: 73% disapprove even of doing business with sexual minorities.

Nevertheless, Ivanishvili's problem is that his controversial statements on the 2008 war, the “foreign agent” law, and the “LGBT propaganda” ban are largely perceived in Georgia as a sign of rapprochement with Russia — which is unacceptable to many voters. However, loud statements from the other opposition wing — marginal parties that are openly pro-Russian — have the effect of making Ivanishvili’s party look reasonable, even patriotic, by comparison.

Pro-Russian electoral front

Despite its policies and statements, Georgian Dream is not universally perceived as a pro-Russian party. Political analyst Paata Zakareishvili, a member of Georgian Dream's first coalition government in 2012-2014, believes that Ivanishvili sought to create a ruling party that would be “undemocratic but not anti-democratic, not Western but not anti-Western, not Russian but not anti-Russian.” This orientation was supposed to prolong his stay in power.

Even the most odious actions of Georgian Dream cannot be considered to be unequivocally pro-Russian, agrees Giorgi Gobronidze. For example, the “foreign agent” law, which was intended to weaken pro-Western NGOs, may be beneficial to the government in the context of Georgia's intensified rapprochement with China. In general, Georgian Dream policies, according to Gobronidze, should not be considered as an ideological strategy: “The ruling party has no ideology. ...They are technocrats trying to follow popular demand and playing on the emotions of the majority of voters.”

Georgian Dream even created a special unit to leverage pro-Russian sentiments. People's Power is an association of MPs who left Georgian Dream over its attempts to gain EU candidacy. In 2024, People’s Power was registered as a separate party, but in the October elections, it will run as part of a single bloc with Georgian Dream. While formally denying that it has a pro-Russian orientation, the party is known for its anti-Western statements and behaves in a more openly pro-Russian way than Georgian Dream does. People's Power often voices a radical position, which after some time can come to be supported by deputies from the ruling party. For example, the statement on the UNM’s responsibility for the 2008 war was voiced by the People's Power in January 2024, and Georgian Dream repeated it this past August.

Georgia’s other notable pro-Russian movement is Alt-Info, established in 2017 as a right-wing conservative media outlet that later evolved into an activist movement and political party.

For a long time, it was believed that the Georgian authorities provided support to Alt-Info. The extreme right-wing movement gained notoriety after a vicious attack on the Tbilisi Pride in July 2021. Despite the horrifying violence, Alt-Info evaded justice for the attack. Since then, its members have continued their activities: burning EU flags, raiding LGBTQ+ events, threatening pro-European and pro-Ukrainian activists, and defending the figure of Joseph Stalin (who was born and raised in Georgia as Joseph Dzhugashvili). At the same time, Alt-Info leaders allow themselves to criticize the authorities. Because of this criticism — or fearing competition for the traditionalist part of the electorate — the government revoked the movement’s party status in 2024 and prohibited it from registering a new one.

Nevertheless, Alt-Info will still participate in the October elections — in a bloc with the Alliance of Patriots, Georgia’s oldest pro-Russian force. The Alliance has existed in Georgia since 2012, consistently maintaining an anti-Western and pro-Russian stance. The head of the Alliance, Irma Inashvili, was most often mentioned in the media in connection with letters and appeals to Putin, in which she emphasized the need for cooperation and dialog with Russia. In the 2020 elections, the Alliance of Patriots of Georgia won just over 3% of the vote and four seats in parliament. In the upcoming elections, the Alliance and Alt-Info are projected to jointly receive 2.6%, coming short of the recently raised parliamentary threshold of 5%.

The need to improve relations with Russia is also promoted by Solidarity for Peace, a new political association headed by Mamuka Pipia, a Russian businessman of Georgian origin with ties to Sergei Gavrilov, a Russian MP whose name is notorious in Georgia. Pipia calls on the two countries to unite in the fight against the West and to conclude a new “Treaty of Georgievsk,” referring to the bilateral agreement concluded between the Russian Empire and the east Georgian kingdom of Kartli-Kakheti on July 24, 1783, establishing eastern Georgia as Russia’s protectorate.

“Ardent pro-Russian forces will get 2-3%. That said, those in favor of good relations with Russia will certainly vote for Georgian Dream,” says Paata Zakareishvili. “Georgian Dream is very good at exploiting the motif of war and peace. It’s not that its voters love Russia; rather, they don't want a war with Russia, so they’ll vote for the Dream because this party is the most effective at avoiding war with Russia.”

In the October elections, Georgians’ fear of war with Russia will be in competition with their desire to return to the path of European integration. In the Caucasus Barometer poll conducted in the spring of 2024, 70% support the idea of Georgia joining the European Union, and 69% call Russia Georgia's main enemy, but only 16% say that war with Russia is actually likely.

Giorgi Gobronidze points out that a significant segment of voters remains undecided and believes that the existing balance may change: “Based on the turbulence of Georgian politics, everything can change in one day.” This was already the case in 2012, when publications about torture in prison led to a collapse in Saakashvili's ratings and resulted in his party’s defeat — and, with it, Georgian Dream's first electoral victory.