Divided Georgia: Saturday’s election will determine Tbilisi's political course for years to come

RU

As Salome spoke from the stage, she and others were blinded by lasers from members of the GD's youth wing, who were sitting on the veranda of a nearby hotel. The hotel is owned by a member of parliament who is also a GD member. A week earlier, these activists had attacked supporters of an opposition party. The police do not help in such situations. “They are civil activists,” said Georgian Prime Minister Irakli Kobakhidze, who clearly knows of whom he speaks.

Propaganda motives

In the 2010s, GD gently torpedoed the idea of Georgia joining the European community. Since the turn of the decade, and especially since February 2022, it has been doing everything it can to return Georgia to the arms of Russia. The latest achievement in this regard is the willingness of European officials to cancel the agreement on visa-free travel for Georgian citizens.

Two months before the elections, the GD openly warned that if it won, it would declare its rivals, and all theirs satellites and successors, as an unconstitutional force. By removing the United National Movement (UNM), founded by Mikheil Saakashvili, from politics, the GD would be able to ”revitalize the political system.” The purported reason for taking this step will be the UNM's ”criminal role” in unleashing the 2008 war, in which Russia wrested the rebel province of South Ossetia from Georgia.

The government literally lists the entire opposition as rivals to be banned — even Salome Zourabichvili, whom the GD itself chose as president in 2018 before she became its opponent in February 2022. Zourabichvili's role has grown a lot in 2024 — she tries to unite the opposition in order to maintain the country’s course towards integration in EU institutions.

Bidzina Ivanishvili and his associates have threatened opposition leaders with criminal prosecution, and their targets have already been subjected to pressure and intimidation. The registration of opposition parties from July 2024 can be cancelled at the request of the Anti-Corruption Bureau, which is fully loyal to the government. By accusing several opposition leaders of corruption, the authorities are clearly hinting at such a scenario.

The accusation of waging a past war rhymes well with the claim that Georgia’s opposition is intent on waging a future one. GD has often accused the opposition, Washington, and Brussels of wanting to open a :second front: against Russia inside Georgia itself. Promising peace (i.e. friendship with Russia) to the electorate, the GD displays pictures of destroyed Ukrainian cities in its election campaign ads, suggesting that this is what will happen to Georgian cities if the opposition wins. The government has repeatedly fined opposition media for refusing to run such unethical advertisements. GD also promises voters the triumph of traditional values — i.e. a ban on LGBT propaganda.

The EU has repeatedly called for an end to false anti-European propaganda, which does not fit well with Georgia's stated intention to join the EU. But over the past two years, such propaganda has only increased.

A new theme of this election was GD's hints at the possibility of peacefully restoring Georgia's territorial integrity (20% of its territory has been taken by Russia). The Foreign Ministry of Russia has promised to assist Georgia in establishing relations with the rebel regions. But it does not appear that GD has secured any firm agreements with Moscow on this issue. Rather, the theme is simply being used to attract patriotic voters.

Ivanishvili, who is ready to apologize for the 2008 war despite the disagreement of Georgian society, probably understands that the reintegration of the country’s rebellious neighbors is only possible with Russian patronage. The Kremlin sees Abkhazia and South Ossetia as a trap, a Trojan horse for Georgia. The price for the formal restoration of territorial integrity will be Tbilisi’s rejection of Europe and a complete loss of independence in foreign policy decisions.

Electoral fraud

Preparations for the elections are being carried out with numerous violations. The authorities are using administrative resources, putting pressure on public sector workers and employees of large companies. Several hundred voters have had their identity cards taken away or their numbers copied through threats and bribery. In order to guarantee that they will vote for the ruling party, law enforcement officials have taken personal data from many residents of Adjara and civil servants in various regions. All this is necessary to put pressure on voters and deprive them of their freedom of expression.

All the pre-election rallies of the GD authorities were attended by civil servants whose attendance was something short of voluntary. It appears some of them will vote against their will as well. GD members actively participate in events organized at the expense of the state budget and make use of them for political ends. Part of their campaign budget was used to bribe voters. Shortly before the vote, the government donated several pieces of land to the Georgian Orthodox Church, which in turn supported the ruling party.

There are widespread defamation and hate speech campaigns being waged against political candidates and leaders of election monitoring organizations.

The boundary between the state and the ruling party has literally been erased, says Transparency International Georgia (TIG), and there is no fair electoral environment. In fact, the law on foreign agents prohibits organizations like TIG from working in Georgia, and the government is already making political claims against it. The Central Election Commission actually represents the interests of the GD, and local election commissions are often made up of budget officials or civil servants. The head of the special police forces, Zviad Kharebashvili, who has been sanctioned by the U.S. for violently breaking up anti-opposition rallies, will be in charge of police security on election day. This could lead to voter intimidation.

Pre-electoral layout

In the 2024 elections, the GD aims to win a constitutional majority — over 75% of the seats — in parliament. In the last election (2020), it won 48% of the vote but 60% of the seats, as 20% of the seats were distributed in single-member constituencies. Now all MPs are elected by proportional representation, with a 5% threshold necessary for entering parliament. If GD wins 60% of the vote, as a poll commissioned by the pro-governmental TV Imedi promises, it will have more than 2/3 of the seats in the legislature. But even in this case, it is impossible for GD to win 75% of the seats without large-scale falsification.

The data of all the other sociological services do not show anything similar to the polls on which GD relies. It follows that the GD will either have to concede defeat or literally steal the elections by redistributing some 20 to 30 percent of the votes via outright fraud.

According to the Caucasus Barometer, one of the most authoritative sociological surveys in Georgia, a CRRC poll showed that one year ago, only 21% were ready to vote for the GD in the elections and about the same number (19%) for the opposition. According to this poll, the level of trust in the Prime Minister and his cabinet of GD ministers is about the same as that of the opposition-minded president, suggesting that the electoral forces of the government and the opposition are about equal. At the same time, 71% of respondents were in favor of joining the EU and 57% were in favor of joining NATO. Perhaps some of those who supported the GD and the idea of joining the EU a year ago have not yet realized that the GD is leading the country in the opposite direction.

NDI and CRRC polls are rarely conducted in Georgia. Other polls are not independent (they are commissioned by parties and the media), and the spread between their results is very large. The Edison Research poll commissioned by the opposition Formula TV promises opposition parties a total of 55% of the vote, while GD comes in with only 33% (there is another poll with similar results). On the other hand, the Gorbi poll, commissioned by GD, gives it 60% and the opposition 29% (it assumes that two of the opposition blocs will not cross the threshold to enter parliament).

On Oct. 23, three new polls were published, all of which fell in line with previous estimates. The Edison Research poll gives GD 34% and the four opposition blocs 53%. A new Savanta poll for opposition TV Mtavari showed a similar result: 35% for the GD and 52% for the opposition blocs. The Gorbi poll for government TV Imedi also repeated its previous results: 60% for GD and 31% for the opposition. According to this poll, two opposition blocs will not enter parliament, giving GD 72% of the seats and the opposition 28%. Assuming that the Edison and Savanta polls are correct but that the official results of the election match those predicted by Gorbi, there is a good chance that the government will have falsified around a quarter of the votes cast.

GD's support seems to have dropped in recent years —from 48% to the 35-40% range. The desire to concentrate more power in its own hands, aided by pressure from Moscow, have forced the GD to dissociate itself from the mood of the electorate. Its rabid propaganda against Brussels and Washington may convince some Georgian citizens, but it repels the majority. This largely explains why the authorities are so nervous.

It is possible, however, that the Edison and Savanta polls exaggerate the extent to which ordinary Georgian citizens, especially those outside major cities, are interested in politics, particularly given how quickly Georgian parties are born, form alliances, divorce, and die. A more realistic forecast seems to be that both the government and the opposition will get 40-45% of the vote if the votes are counted honestly. But there is no hope for honesty from the GD, which has subordinated state institutions. It is reasonable to assume that pressure and falsifications will increase the GD's votes by 10-15%, and that after the redistribution lowers the share of an opposition party or two below the 5% floor, the GD's superiority over the opposition will be doubled.

In the final weeks before the elections, the opposition has mobilized its supporters, while the authorities have stepped up the pressure and the falsifications, preparing for the violent scenarios that will follow. Protests against falsifications will be met with fierce resistance from the police and special forces (clearly not without instructions from their Russian colleagues) and aggressive GD youth. The Georgian security forces' appetite for brutality after the suppression of the 2023-24 protests has increased significantly.

Enemies everywhere

As the country goes to vote, Georgian citizens are not particularly interested in the intricacies of party policy programmes. As in the recent elections in Moldova, there are essentially two questions on the ballot: whether Georgia will move towards Europe or Russia, and whether it will become an authoritarian system or remain a pluralistic democracy. The political struggle in Georgia isn’t focused on the country's development; instead, it revolves around ideological phantoms and fears created by the authorities.

The intransigence of the parties, which accuse each other of treason and betrayal of national interests, increases the likelihood of falsified results and subsequent mass protests. Politicians who lose elections (whether GD or the opposition) will most likely have to leave the country or else face jail. The GD has repeatedly shown in recent years that it is prepared to base public campaigns on lies and forgery. If it can, it will remove its opponents from politics by any means necessary.

In recent interviews, Ivanishvili has openly outlined this strategy, calling his political opponents ”enemies of the people” and promising to prosecute them. He presents politics as a battle between good and evil, in which his party is opposed only by “people without a homeland,” financed by the West: “everyone who is positive and loves the country will find a place with us.” It is an endless struggle, one in which, purportedly, “the evil force is coming; its energy never ends because a huge force is supporting it from outside”.

Ivanishvili's view of the world has become very similar to that of Stalin and Putin. And Ivanishvili's numerous statements of this kind have made the opposition doubt his mental stability. Conspiracy theories are being spread by many of Ivanishvili's associates.

For Ivanishvili, surrounded by enemies and traitors, the law on foreign agents, copied from the Russian one, is not a coincidence but a condition for survival. The Georgian law is even stricter than the Russian version, as it requires the disclosure of all personal data of contractors and employees of a ”foreign agent.” The beatings of politicians and activists, which have become regular in Georgia, shows how dangerous such political developments can be.

Affective polarization

Georgian society is divided not only along political lines, but also by values. Some Georgians favor an alliance with the U.S. and Europe, while others favor friendship with Russia (or, at least, good relations with Russia in the hopes of protecting themselves from aggression). Some Georgians are close to European liberalism, while others adhere to Orthodox conservatism. The figures of Saakashvili and Ivanishvili are polarizing Georgians — some see them as national traitors, while others venerate them as heroes.

Polarization and the demand for a third force (in addition to the GD and UNM) have been increasing in recent years. Caucasus Barometer reports that in 2021, when asked the question ”which political party is closer to you,” 44% of respondents either answered ”none,” or else refused to answer. By the spring of 2024, this figure had grown to 60%. This effect was reinforced by affective polarization: at least one third of Georgian citizens are sure that the opposite political camp does not work in the country's interests.

Recently, under Zourabichvili's leadership, the opposition has addressed the lack of a ”third force” and the fragmentation of small opposition parties. Over the summer, the opposition managed to unite into four electoral blocs, the 'senior' of which (linked to the UNM) can count on 14-19% of the vote and the 'junior' on 8-11%. Zourabichvili insisted on further consolidation of the blocs, but this was prevented by the ambitions of the smaller groups’ leaders.

Nevertheless, at Zourabichvili's insistence, all opposition forces signed a ”charter” outlining an action plan to bring Georgia back onto the European path. But this is a complicated path, and it remains unclear whether the opposition leaders will be able to act together if the GD is defeated.

Another problem for the opposition is the country’s policy toward Russia. Zourabichvili is right: Ivanishvili is panicked by Putin. Hence the emergence of rhetoric about how peace is better than war, and how only GD will bring peace to Georgia. But even the opposition, which is determined to minimize economic ties with Russia, has no answer to the question of what to do if Georgia's European course is rejected by Russia, as happened in Ukraine. Georgia is a prisoner of geography and finds it extremely difficult to defend itself against Russian aggression. The realization of this fact is causing a split in society.

Economic split

Under GD, previous economic reforms were stopped, and the policy of integration with the EU was suspended and then reversed. Russia bet on a break with the West, and Georgia's informal leader, Bidzina Ivanishvili, has bet on cooperation with Russia.

In recent years, the Georgian economy has actually been boosted by the sanctions against Russia. Over the past decade, Georgia's dollar-denominated GDP has doubled to over $30 billion, and the average GDP growth rate for 2021-2024 will reach a fantastic 9.5%. Emigrants driven out of Russia by the war and dictatorship have brought money and investment to Georgia and boosted consumer demand. But Georgia earns much more by supplying goods to Russia in contravention of the Western sanctions regime.

In the first nine months of 2024, cars accounted for 37% of Georgia’s exports — this despite the fact that Georgia does not produce any cars. Over this period, Georgia imported $2.34 billion worth of cars and re-exported more than three-quarters of them to Russia — whether directly or via Azerbaijan, Armenia, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. The real export of cars is higher than the official statistics indicate: Georgian regulations allow entrepreneurs to re-export cars, bypassing customs statistics. Suppliers of luxury cars take particular advantage of this.

Polarization has also reached the economy. If GD wins the elections, the construction of the Anaklia deep-water port will be continued with Chinese partners; if it loses — with American partners, as was originally planned.

Death to traitors?

The EU has every reason to fear that the elections and the struggle over their results will result in Georgia's further transition to authoritarianism. Ivanishvili will continue his rapprochement with Russia, scaring the electorate with the insidious West, but in reality fearing Putin's pressure. Representatives of banned parties will sit in large numbers in parliament, and the authorities will organize showy criminal trials against them — a ”feast of the victors.” The opposition, likewise, sees the GD government as a traitor with whom it is impossible and unnecessary to reach an agreement.

Georgian political culture is not based on compromise and coalitions. Since the time of the country’s first post-Soviet president, Zviad Gamsakhurdia, accusing opponents of treason and betrayal has become a true political tradition. The current Georgian prime minister even accused the president, their supreme commander-in-chief, of treason in a speech to the military.

Both the authorities and the opposition are determined to destroy their opponents, not to compromise. In this heated situation, the law on foreign agents leads to harassment, accusations of espionage and treason, and criminal prosecution (on Thursday, police searched a Georgian employee of the Atlantic Council who is studying the spread of Russian propaganda in Georgia). If the opposition loses the election, thousands of NGOs will lose the opportunity to work in Georgia. The stakes are high for both the opposition and the government.

Polarization has broken national unity — quite simply, one cannot unite with traitors, regardless of whether they are real or only perceived. One part of Georgia mentally lives in Europe, where the interests of the community of countries are more important than national interests, while the other part lives in the world of nationalism of the past, where identity is constituted by contrast to the image of the enemy.

Centuries of living next to a strong, aggressive, and dangerous neighbor have had an effect on Georgia. To protect his own power from competition, Ivanishvili is increasingly copying Putin's system. This allows him to gain more and more power in Georgia and to strengthen his relationship with Putin. And if the protests against the election manipulation prove too strong, Putin will help Ivanishvili stay in power by sending in the security forces for a while, as he helped Kazakhstan's president Tokayev three years ago. Ivanishvili seems morally almost ready to be the recipient of such assistance.